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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Bree Leann Larosa appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon 
her conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Coeur d'Alene patrol officer Craig Buhl effectuated a traffic stop on a 
vehicle he observed speeding and failing to use a turn signal. (Tr., p.9, Ls.2-5.) 
Upon approaching the vehicle, Officer Buhl observed that the driver, Larosa, was 
nervous, and had bloodshot eyes and sores on her face. (Tr., p.9, L.16 - p.11, 
L.25.) Officer Buhl also learned that Larosa's driver's license was suspended 
and she did not have insurance on the vehicle. (Tr., p.10, Ls.7-18.) Based upon 
Larosa's appearance and demeanor, Officer Buhl suspected Larosa of being 
under the influence of a controlled substance, and asked her to exit the vehicle. 
(Tr., p.12, Ls.1-23.) 
Larosa told Officer Buhl that she used methamphetamine three days 
earlier and had subsequently slept for three days. (Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15, L.6.) 
She also told him that she had a son who had been removed from her home, and 
who was the subject of a pending child protection proceeding. (R., p.22.) Larosa 
eventually admitted to Officer Buhl that she had a syringe in her vehicle that she 
used to inject methamphetamine. (Tr., p.15, L.7 - p.16, L.9.) Larosa gave 
Officer Buhl consent to search her vehicle, and Officer Buhl recovered the 
syringe. (Tr., p.17, Ls.1-22.) Officer Buhl elected not to arrest Larosa, but 
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informed her that he was going to have the syringe tested for the presence of 
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.17, Ls.10-24.) 
The next day, Officer Buhl's supervisor asked him to visit Larosa's house 
to make sure there were no additional children there who may be endangered. 
(Tr., p.17, L.25 - p.19, L.16.) Officer Buhl and Officer Hanna then went to 
Larosa's residence. (Tr., p.19, L.17 - p.20, L.9.) Officer Buhl knocked at one 
door, and Officer Hanna stood at another. (Tr., p.20, L.24 - p.21, L.14.) Larosa 
answered the door at which Officer Buhl was knocking and gave him consent to 
enter. (Tr., p.21, L.15- p.22, L.16.) Larosa told Officer Buhl that her roommate 
and her boyfriend, Ryan Peppers, were also in the house. (Tr., p.24, Ls.13-19.) 
It was determined by the officers that Peppers was currently on felony probation. 
(Tr., p.26, Ls.4-9.) 
After Officer Buhl expressed his concern about the possible presence of 
children at the residence, Larosa took Officer Buhl to a back bedroom where a 
child was sleeping. (Tr., p.23, L.2 - p.24, L.12; p.26, L.12 - p.27, L.1.) From this 
location, Officer Buhl saw, through an open door, a man sitting down in another 
bedroom. (Tr., p.27, Ls.2-8.) Larosa told Officer Buhl the man was her 
boyfriend, Peppers. (Tr., p.27, Ls.9-13.) Officer Buhl asked Larosa if he could 
speak with Peppers, and Larosa replied that he could. (Tr., p.27, Ls.14-17.) 
Officer Buhl then asked Larosa if he could enter the room Peppers was in. (Tr., 
p.28, Ls.17-18.) Larosa responded by standing up and walking into the room 
occupied by Peppers. (Tr., p.28, Ls.19-22.) Officer Buhl followed her and stood 
just inside the door of the room. (Tr., p.28, Ls.21-25.) 
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From this position, and while speaking with Peppers, Officer Buhl saw a 
glass pipe in plain view on a dresser. (Tr., p.29, Ls.8-18.) Larosa told Officer 
Buhl that it was a marijuana pipe and that it was hers. (Tr., p.29, Ls.19-25.) 
Larosa then consented to Officer Buhl's request to search the rest of the room. 
(Tr., p.30, L.18 - p.31, L.7.) Officer Buhl searched the room and found 
marijuana, syringes, and a spoon with white residue. (Tr., p.31, L.8 - p.34, L.13.) 
The state charged Larosa with possession of methamphetamine, 
misdemeanor injury to child, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug 
paraphernalia. (R., pp.77-79.) Larosa made a motion to suppress the controlled 
substances and paraphernalia found in her house. (R., pp.92-116.) After a 
hearing, the district court denied the motion. (R., pp.144-145; Tr., p.6, L.5- p.75, 
L.12.) 
Pursuant to plea agreement, Larosa entered a conditional guilty plea to 
possession of methamphetamine, preserving her right to appeal the district 
court's denial of her motion to suppress. (R., p.147; Tr., p.78, L.15 - p.84, L.7.) 
The state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.153-155.) The district court 
imposed a unified three-year sentence with one and one-half years fixed, but 
suspended the sentence and placed Larosa on probation for two years. (R., 
pp.156-160.) Larosa timely appealed. (R., pp.171-174.) 
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ISSUE 
Larosa states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Larosa's motion 
to suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as: 
Has Larosa failed to show clear error in the district court's factual finding 
that Larosa voluntarily consented to the officers' entry to and search of her 
house? 
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ARGUMENT 
Larosa Has Failed To Show Clear Error In The District Court's Factual Finding 
That Larosa Voluntarily Consented To The Officers' Entry To And Search Of Her 
House 
A. Introduction 
Larosa contends that the district court erred in denying her motion to 
suppress evidence found in her house during a child welfare check. (See 
generally Appellant's brief.) Specifically, Larosa contends that the district court 
erred in concluding that the consent she gave officers to enter and search her 
house was voluntary and not coerced. (Id.) However, the record supports the 
district court's determination. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). 
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, 
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the 
province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 
110 (Ct. App. 2003). 
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C. The District Court Correctly Concluded That Larosa's Consent To the 
Officers' Entry To And Search of Her House Was Voluntary 
"Although a warrantless entry or search of a residence is generally illegal 
and violative of the Fourth Amendment, such an entry or search may be 
rendered reasonable by an individual's consent." State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693, 
695, 978 P.2d 881, 883 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 
522, 716 P.2d 1288, 1294 (1986); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 707, 963 P.2d 
387, 390 (Ct. App. 1998)). 
Consent is valid if it is free and voluntary. State v. Varie, 135 Idaho 848, 
852, 26 P.3d 31, 35 (2001). The voluntariness of an individual's consent is a 
question of fact to be determined based upon the totality of the circumstances. 
ill at 848, 852, 26 P.3d at 35; see also Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 
218, 225-226 (1973)). In order to be valid, consent cannot be the result of 
duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Bustamente, 412 U.S. at 228. A 
voluntary decision is one that is "the product of an essentially free and 
unconstrained choice by its maker." ill at 225. An individual's consent is 
involuntary, on the other hand, "if his will has been overborne and his capacity for 
self-determination critically impaired." State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 
P.3d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 2006) (citing Bustamente, 412 U.S. at 225). The mere 
presence of officers asking for consent to search is not sufficient, as a matter of 
law, to constitute improper police duress or coercion. See United States v. 
Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
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As the Idaho Court of Appeals explained in State v. Rector, 144 Idaho 
643, 646, 167 P.3d 780, 783 (Ct. App. 2006), a trial court's factual determination 
regarding consent is entitled to deference: 
The trial court is the proper forum for the "careful sifting of 
the unique facts and circumstances of each case" necessary in 
determining voluntariness. Even though the evidence may be 
equivocal and somewhat in dispute, if the trial court's finding of fact 
is based on reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 
record, it will not be disturbed on appeal. In short, whether a 
consent to a search was voluntary is a question of fact, and our 
standard of review requires that we accept a trial court's factual 
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Findings will not be 
deemed clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. 
(Citations omitted.) 
Applying these principles to the evidence before it, the district court 
correctly concluded that Larosa voluntarily consented to the officers' entry into 
her house and to their search of the bedroom. (Tr., p.73, L.21 - p.75, L.3.) The 
court specifically found that Officer Buhl's testimony describing Larosa's consent 
was credible, and that there was nothing to indicate that this consent was 
coerced. (Tr., p.73, L.24 - p.75, L.3.) There were only two officers present at 
Larosa's residence, and Officer Buhl, who made the requests to enter and search 
the house, did not raise his voice when addressing Larosa. (Tr., p.22, Ls.12-13.) 
On appeal, Larosa does not dispute the district court's conclusion that she 
consented to the entry and search of her house, but instead contends that this 
consent was not voluntary because it was coerced by the officers. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.7-9.) Specifically, Larosa argues that this coercion was demonstrated 
by: the officers' late night arrival to her house, the positioning of one officer at 
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each of two separate doors outside her residence, Officer Buhl being armed, and 
her recognition of Officer Buhl as the officer who pulled her over the previous 
evening. (Id.) However, these factors fail to demonstrate that the district court 
erred in concluding that Larosa's consent was voluntary. 
Officers Buhl and Hanna arrived at Larosa's residence at 11 :45 pm. (Tr., 
p.47, Ls.4-19.) While time of day can be a factor in determining whether a 
defendant's consent was voluntary, see U.S. v. Quintero, 648 F.3d 660, 667-668 
(8th Cir. 2011 ), Larosa has not attempted to articulate how the officers' relatively 
late arrival in this case coerced her into consenting to their request to enter her 
house and search the bedroom. There is no indication from the record that 
Larosa was asleep when the officers arrived, or that she was in some other 
mental or physical state that would have hindered her ability to voluntarily 
consent to Officer Buhl's requests. Without such context, the mere lateness of 
the officers' arrival is, at best, of only minimally persuasive value in supporting 
Larosa's contention that she was coerced. 
Upon arrival at the residence, Officer Buhl went to one door, and Officer 
Hanna went to the other. (Tr., p.21, Ls.1-14.) Officer Buhl knocked on the door 
where he was positioned and Larosa answered that door. (Id.) Larosa's 
contention that this positioning of the officers was coercive is belied by the fact 
that there is no indication from the record that Larosa even knew of the presence 
of Officer Hanna outside the second door before she made contact with Officer 
Buhl. In any event, the simple strategic positioning of two officers outside of a 
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house is not so overbearing as to render subsequent consent offered by the 
resident of that house involuntary. 
Next, while Officer Buhl was armed, he never drew his weapon during his 
contact with Larosa. (Tr., p.22, Ls.9-11; p.28, Ls.2-4; p.31, Ls.3-4.) The mere 
fact that an on-duty police officer has a holstered weapon during a contact with 
an individual is unlikely to be coercive to the degree as to render her subsequent 
consent involuntary. If the contrary was true, there could likely be no consensual 
encounters between individuals and on-duty police officers. 
Finally, the fact that Larosa likely recognized Officer Buhl as the officer 
that pulled her over the previous evening does not support her contention that 
her consent was coerced. Larosa's previous contact with Officer Buhl was far 
from coercive. Officer Buhl declined to arrest Larosa even after recovering a 
syringe that Larosa admitted to injecting methamphetamine with, and after 
discovering that Larosa was driving on a suspended license. (Tr., p.10, L.4 -
p.17, L.24.) In addition, Officer Buhl did not draw his weapon or place Larosa in 
handcuffs. (Tr., p.16, Ls.18-25.) The entire conversation outside the vehicle 
lasted only approximately five minutes. (Tr., p.64, Ls.7-9.) There was nothing 
about Officer Buhl's actions during the traffic stop that would have caused Larosa 
to feel any enhanced intimidation or coercion upon her recognition of Officer Buhl 
at her doorstep the next day. 
Larosa has failed to show clear error in the district court's factual finding 
that she voluntarily consented to the officers' entry to her house and their search 
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of a bedroom. This Court should therefore affirm her conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment entered 
upon Larosa's conditional guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. 
DATED this 23th day of May, 2013. 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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